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Abstract 
Structural change in agriculture is characterized by the interdependency of farms’ growth decisions 
due to the limited availability of the production factor land. This paper adds to the sparse empirical 
literature on the relation between land market concentration and farm size changes, considering 
different definitions of the relevant market. Using data from the Integrated Administrative Control 
System (IACS) from 2005 until 2017 for Brandenburg, Germany, we find that about half of the land 
transactions occur beyond municipality borders. This emphasizes the importance of carefully 
defining the relevant market. The descriptive analysis shows that although concentration rates, on 
average, did not increase over time, spatial differences are present. In the econometric analysis, 
we apply a two-stage model to analyze how competition for agricultural land impacts the probability 
and level of expansion. It shows that for farms that remained active between 2005 and 2017, farms 
that defragment are less likely to expand. Moreover, we find that the expansion behavior between 
groups of small and large farms differs with increasing inequality. One potential reason for this might 
be the existence of market power in land markets. 
Keywords: farm growth, concentration measures, agricultural land markets, structural change, 
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1 Introduction 
Structural change in the agricultural sector of developed economies is broadly characterized 
by a declining number of farms and an increasing size of surviving farms. Accordingly, the 
strategic choice of farms is often summarized as “grow or go”. Much effort has been spent in 
the agricultural economics literature to describe the dynamics of structural change and to 
understand its drivers. Piet et al. (2012) provide an overview on these drivers that were 
identified in empirical studies. Among these drivers is the profitability of farming, which covers 
aspects such as input and output prices, the efficiency of farming activities, return to farming, 
animal diseases, and off-farm employment possibilities (e.g., Foltz 2004, Breustedt and 
Glauben 2007, Ihle et al. 2012). More potential drivers are the age or education of the farm 
holder, clustered under the term human capital (e.g., Möllers and Fritzsch 2010, Saint-Cyr et 
al. 2019). Furthermore, the (treatment) effect of agricultural policy instruments on structural 
change and farm survival have been extensively studied. This includes the analysis of  
(de-)coupled governmental payments and the general policy environment (e.g., Breustedt and 
Glauben 2007, Key and Roberts 2007, Ihle et al. 2012, Bartolini and Viaggi 2013, Storm et al. 
2015). 
The phrase “grow or go”, however, highlights another important feature of structural change: 
the interdependence of strategic farm decisions due to the limited availability of the core 
production factor land. Clearly, expansion in farm size is only feasible if other farms decide to 
shrink or quit. This interdependency relates structural change in agriculture to competition in 
land markets. Competition in land markets is explicitly considered in agent-based models of 
regional structural change, as suggested in the seminal paper of Balmann (1997). These 
studies focus, in general, on a switch in the policy regime (e.g., Happe et al. 2008, Brady et al. 
2009) and more specifically on effects induced by the implementation of single policy 
measures, such as the introduction of the German Renewable Energy Act (Appel et al. 2016) 
or implementation of Ecological Focus Areas in the European Union’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (Sahrbacher et al. 2016).  
Though it is widely acknowledged that spatial competition in land markets constitutes the 
mechanism by which farm size adjustment takes place, it is hard to implement this idea in 
empirical models of structural change (in contrast to optimization models, such as spatially 
explicit agent-based models). Nevertheless, there are a few attempts to capture competition 
and neighborhood effects when explaining farm size changes or farm exit. Storm et al. (2015) 
investigate farm survival in Norway in a spatially explicit setting by emphasizing spatial 
interdependencies. They find that farm survival not only depends on the amount of own direct 
payments received, but on the direct payments neighboring farmers receive and argue that 
ignoring this spatial interdependency would overestimate the effect of own payments. Saint-
Cyr et al. (2019) further develop spatial dependency concepts in a structural change context 
by evaluating the impact of the limited production factor land. Analyzing exits from farming in 
Brittany, France, they argue that a neighbor’s farm size may affect a farmer’s decision to remain 
active. Identifying three farm types, they find both positive and negative effects of neighboring 
farm size on farm survival.  
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Against this background, this paper adds to the sparse empirical literature on the relation 
between land market competition and farm size changes. Using data from the Integrated 
Administrative Control System (IACS), we exemplarily show how this data can be applied to 
track farm size development over time and to measure the concentration of agricultural land. 
This helps answer a couple of relevant research questions: How concentrated is the 
agricultural land market in Brandenburg and does land concentration steadily increase over 
time? How to define the relevant market size for the assessment of concentration in land 
markets? How do internal farm characteristics, such as size and fragmentation, and land 
market competition affect land acquisition decisions? Our results add to the discussion about 
tighter regulations of agricultural land markets (cf. Balmann 2015, Odening and Hüttel 2018). 
A major concern about unregulated land markets is that the resulting allocation of land fosters 
an undesired agricultural structure in a sense that large industrialized farms gain competitive 
advantage over smaller family farms and that young farmers with financial constraints cannot 
compete with financial investors.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In the next section, we describe the 
theoretical framework of our analysis by briefly reviewing economical concepts and the 
relevant literature; Section 3 describes our study region and the available data; Section 4 
describes the spatial development of farm sizes and derives land concentration indicators 
based on alternative definitions of the relevant market; Section 5 applies these concentration 
indicators to assess the impact of land market competition in the expansion behavior of farms 
by means of a Heckman model; and Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications 
of our findings.  
2 Theoretical Background 
The dynamics of firm growth is subject to various theoretical models and empirical studies. 
Perhaps the most basic model is Gibrat’s law. It states that firm size and growth are 
independent, meaning that firms in an industry grow proportionally at a constant rate, 
irrespective of the initial size and past growth pattern (Sutton 1997). Assuming further that 
firms’ (stochastic) growth rates are independent of each other implies a lognormal distribution 
of firm sizes. The validity of Gibrat’s law can be tested under different scenarios. In its most 
general form, this “law” applies to all firms in an industry, including shrinking and exiting firms, 
while more restrictive analyses consider only firms that survived in a given time period. Most 
empirical studies conclude that Gibrat’s law is rejected in general, but that it may hold true for 
subsamples of some industries (Santarelli et al. 2006). For the agricultural sector, Weiss (1998) 
provides evidence against proportionate effects. This finding is not too surprising because the 
independence assumption of growth rates among farms is apparently violated due to the fixed 
supply of land, at least if farm size is measured by land endowment. Another concern about 
Gibrat’s law is that it has little economic content. Actually, it claims that individual growth rates 
are random. Since Weiss (1998), many studies have proposed economic variables that should 
condition the growth rate distribution of farms based on behavioral assumptions, particularly 
profit maximization. In the context of our analysis, it is useful to group the variables that impact 
the incentive to grow into two categories, namely internal farm characteristics and land market 
competition measures. 
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2.1 Internal farm characteristics affecting farm growth 
It is widely acknowledged that agricultural production is characterized by both economies and 
diseconomies of size, which is reflected by an s-shaped relation between size (land) and farm 
output (e.g., Raup 1969, Alvarez and Arias 2004, Zhang et al. 2019). Economies of size may 
result from the indivisibilities of production factors, such as machinery, buildings, and (family) 
labor. Diseconomies of size can be explained by increasing transportation costs and 
complexity of coordinating and monitoring production processes in large farms. These 
counteracting forces suggest the existence of an “optimal” farm size. Clearly, optimal farm size 
differs between farm types and changes over time according to technical progress. In addition, 
it is likely that minimal average production costs are constant for a broad range of farm sizes 
(Rasmussen 2011). Thus, we hypothesize that medium sized farms have a larger incentive to 
grow compared to large farms, which are already close to the region of optimality 
(Hypothesis 1). The indivisibility of some production factors also implies a minimal farm size, 
below which farm income does not cover living costs. Since rapid growth is accompanied by 
large adjustment costs, quitting agriculture or switching to part-time farming is often the only 
feasible option for small farms.  
Another strand of literature relates productivity to size adjustments, as well as to the entry and 
exit of firms. Hopenhayn (1992) analyses the dynamics of an industry with endogenous entry 
and exit. The model considers a perfectly competitive but heterogeneous industry where firms 
differ with respect to their productivity level, which is stochastic. The firm-specific optimal output 
(i.e., their size) is a function of the endogenous output price and productivity. In this modeling 
framework, the size distribution is stochastically increasing with age, meaning that larger firms 
have a higher probability of survival. Kersting et al. (2016) extend Hopenhayn’s model by 
introducing a sectoral constraint for a production factor.1 They find that a tradable limited 
production factor does not necessarily reduce the speed of adjustment within the industry since 
a tradable quota increases the liquidation value and provides an incentive for inefficient firms 
to cease production. 
The aforementioned stochastic dynamic equilibrium models consider productivity as an 
exogenous variable, but many attempts have been made in the literature to disentangle the 
relation between production efficiency and farm size by linking efficiency to other factors, e.g., 
natural conditions or managerial skills (cf. Ford and Shonkwiler 1994, Lakner 2009, Byma and 
Tauer 2010). In the context of a spatial analysis of land allocation, the fragmentation of 
farmland is of particular interest as it is directly linked to transportation costs (Deininger et al. 
2012). Case studies for France (Latruffe and Piet 2014) and the Czech Republic (Curtiss et al. 
2013) confirm expectations that land fragmentation increases production costs and decreases 
yields, revenue, profitability, and efficiency. Therefore, we conjecture that the willingness to 
grow is higher if a farm’s expansion helps improve consolidation of land plots and decrease 
land fragmentation (Hypothesis 2).  
                                                
1  Kersting et al. (2016) consider a milk quota, but their modeling idea applies to the production factor 
land as well. 
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2.2 Land market competition and farm growth 
While the willingness to pay for land acquisition is primarily driven by internal factors, the costs 
of farm expansion are strongly influenced by the intensity of competition in local land rental 
markets. If, for example, a farm has no competitors, it may act as a monopsonist on the land 
market, reduce lease rates below marginal revenues, and expand further than under fierce 
competition. The intensity of competition is commonly measured by absolute or relative 
concentration indicators, such as the concentration rate (CR), Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(HHI), or the Gini coefficient (Gini). The implications of farmland concentration on farm growth, 
however, are thus far not fully understood. Back et al. (2018) investigate how concentration 
and disparity of agricultural land at the county-level affect land values. They find a negative 
correlation between concentration measures and land values, which makes it easier for larger 
farms to expand. Using game-theoretic arguments, Hüttel and Margarian (2009) conjecture 
that farm growth is rather slow if land is distributed equally among farms because their 
willingness to pay is similar and sunk costs may prevent them from exiting. In contrast, if only 
few large farms exist in a region, these are expected to grow rather rapidly. At the same time, 
smaller farms grow even less than they would have if farm size were more equally distributed 
(Hüttel and Margarian 2009). More recently, Saint-Cyr et al. (2019) use concentration 
measures at the municipality-level to explain exit probabilities. By distinguishing between 
several farm types, they identify heterogeneous effects of neighboring farm size on the survival 
probability of farms. With respect to unequally distributed farm sizes in a region, they discover 
that inequality leads to increased structural change. However, the reactions differ according to 
farm type. This supports the hypothesis that expansion is less likely in equally distributed 
regions, while increasing inequality triggers the expansion of larger farms (Hypothesis 3). 
A prerequisite for the empirical measurement of concentration is the definition of the relevant 
geographical market size. Often administrative units are used as a pragmatic approach (e.g., 
Piet et al. 2012). However, this has three problems. First, which regional level should be 
chosen for the empirical analysis, e.g., counties or municipalities? Second, the size of 
administrative units can largely differ, which hampers a comparison of concentration measures 
across regions. Third, competition for land will take place across borders of administrative 
units. Ideally, the relevant regional market is defined by the viewpoint of active farmers who 
operate the land. Again, the concept of substitutability is helpful, but now it refers to land plots 
with different locations. This suggests the calculation of isodistance lines or isochrones around 
a farmstead. Accordingly, all farmers located in a “reasonable” economic distance from a land 
plot can be considered as competitors on the demand side of the rental market. The 
implementation of this concept requires the determination of an acceptable distance (in 
kilometers or travel time) between a farmstead and a land plot, which is difficult to identify. 
Some authors suggest a fixed radius around a farm to determine the potential area of interest 
for a tenant. Cotteleer et al. (2008) derive the size of the local land market from the empirical 
distribution of distances between farms and land plots. They find that 90 percent of all land 
plots lie within a radius of 6.7 kilometers in the Netherlands. Interest for land in terms of 
willingness to pay, however, will not be constant within this radius. Spatial competition models 
assert that willingness to pay for land declines with distance (e.g., Graubner and Balmann 
2012). Moreover, it will depend on the size of the tract and its distance to other plots that are 
already operated by the tenant.  
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Finally, it should be noted that the interpretation of concentration measures is ambiguous. The 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SPC) paradigm in the tradition of Bain (1951) postulates a 
clear link between market structure and firms’ profits and predicts a higher degree of market 
power with a decreasing number of competitors. This view is challenged by the efficient market 
hypothesis, according to which firms have heterogeneous cost structures (Demsetz 1974). 
Due to competition, firms with low production costs grow and expand their market shares and 
profits while firms with higher production costs are driven out of the market. Thus, higher profits 
would not be the result of market power exertion, but of superior efficiency.  
3 Study Region and Data 
The study is conducted in the federal state of Brandenburg, Germany in former East Germany. 
During the division of Germany, East and West German agricultural structures evolved 
differently. While in East Germany the agricultural sector consisted of state-owned farms 
(Volkseigene Güter) and collective farms (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften, 
hereafter, LPGs), the West German agricultural sector consisted primarily of privately-owned 
farms. Moreover, with an average farm size of 4,500 ha in the LPGs, the East German 
agricultural sector was subject to larger farm structures (Jochimsen 2010). In the aftermath of 
the reunification, several land reforms and laws were put in place to manage the transition and 
privatization in East Germany. As a result, the East German agricultural sector today is subject 
to a dual agricultural structure with large agricultural cooperatives and smaller privately-owned 
farms.  
As of 2017, Brandenburg consists of 14 counties (without cities) and 417 municipalities. The 
total agricultural land in Brandenburg amounts to 1,322,900 ha, which is operated by 
approximately 5,400 farms. This results in an average farm size of approximately 245 ha in 
2017, which is among the highest in Germany. With an increase in average farm size of about 
41 % since 1991, Brandenburg has one of the largest increases in farm size compared to the 
other states in East Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 1993, 2018). Its history and 
characteristics render Brandenburg an interesting candidate for this analysis. 
For the descriptive and econometric analysis we use data from IACS which contains all plots 
that are registered to receive European subsidies based on a geo-referenced land parcel 
identification system. Each plot is associated with a farm registration number indicating the 
farm operating this plot, irrespective of the farmstead’s location or if the land is owned or 
rented. This allows us to draw a more precise and spatially explicit picture of the farms’ 
activities. However, a farm registration number is associated with either a natural or legal 
person, so that a disappearing farm number does not necessarily indicate the farm exiting the 
market, but can be the result of a farm succession or a change in the farm’s legal form. 
Moreover, holding structures with many operators cannot be detected. 
Jana Plogmann; Oliver Mußhoff; Martin Odening; Matthias Ritter 
Farm Growth and Land Concentration 
FORLand-Working Paper 24 (2020)   - 8 - 
Table 1: Descriptive data of the agricultural land market in Brandenburg, 2005 and 
2017 provided by the IACS dataset (corresponding values from the Statistisches 
Bundesamt (2006, 2018) are shown in parentheses) 
 Total agricultural 











size in ha 
Changes of farm 
registration number 
for all plots  
since 2005 
2005 1,325 (1,347) 5,695 (6,668) 233 (202) 76,044 17.4 - 
2017 1,309 (1,323) 5,248 (5,400) 249 (245) 83,816 15.6 44,112 
We have access to IACS data for Brandenburg from 2005 to 2017, which allows us to derive 
information characterizing structural change on the agricultural land market in Brandenburg in 
detail. In Table 1, we provide an overview of the relevant information derived from the IACS 
dataset together with corresponding information from official statistics (if available). Both the 
numbers from official statistics and the IACS dataset report a decrease in the total agricultural 
area and the number of farms, as well as an increase in the average farm size. Differences 
between both datasets may be explained by specifics of the registration procedures and by a 
higher accuracy of the IACS dataset in recent years. Interestingly, the number of land plots 
registered in the IACS dataset increased over the study period, which is in line with the 
decrease in the average plot size. For all plots, the operating farm changed 44,112 times 
between 2005 and 2017. This was assessed by a change in the farm registration number. This 
means that on average, more than half of the plots changed the operator once. However, it is 
also possible that there are plots that changed the operator more than once. 
4 Descriptive Analysis of Concentration in Brandenburg  
To analyze the interdependency of farm growth and concentration in the agricultural land 
market in Brandenburg, it is important to provide a comprehensive and spatially explicit 
overview of concentration indicators. Earlier studies focusing on the measurement of 
concentration on agricultural land markets (e.g., Piet et al. 2012, Back et al. 2018, Saint-Cyr 
et al. 2019) suggest different methods. We follow Back et al. (2018) and apply common 
concentration measures that originate in welfare economics. Figure 1 displays the 
concentration rate (CR) of the three largest farms that are active in the respective municipalities 
in 2005 and 2017. The CR measures absolute concentration in a region as it focuses only on 
the largest farms in a region. In our case, a value equal to one indicates that the whole 
agricultural area is operated by a maximum of three farms. Figure 1 shows that the temporal 
and spatial development of farming structures is heterogeneous. While municipalities in the 
north of Brandenburg are less concentrated, concentration is stronger in the south of 
Brandenburg. There are pronounced changes in concentration between 2005 and 2017, but it 
is noteworthy that there is no clear tendency towards higher concentration over time. Both 
increasing and decreasing concentration can be observed in the study period. 
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Figure 1: Concentration rates of the three largest farms at the municipality level in 
Brandenburg 
Source: own calculations based on the IACS dataset 
Choosing municipalities as underlying regions to assess land market concentration is a 
pragmatic and commonly applied approach (e.g., Piet et al. 2012, Saint-Cyr et al. 2019), but 
poses problems. It is prone to inaccuracies that arise, for example, when farms are located 
close to a municipality border and the farm’s main region of interest for expansion is located in 
the neighboring municipality. Assessing land market concentration hence requires a more 
precise definition of regions in which farmers are potentially interested in land. This would 
provide a more reliable identification of neighboring farms as potential competitors.  
An alternative to fixed administrative units is provided by Cotteleer et al. (2008), who 
empirically derive distances between farmsteads and transacted plots for the Dutch land 
market. These distances define the radius serving as a base to define regions in which 
concentration is measured. They identify this radius by the 90th percentile of the distances, 
which corresponds to 6.7 km. This means that for 90 % of the sales transactions in the Dutch 
land market, the transacted plot has a maximum distance of 6.7 km to the farmstead.  
2005 2017 
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function of the distances in km between farms and 
the acquired land plots in Brandenburg 
 
To identify farm-specific regions for our dataset similar to Cotteleer et al. (2008), we consider 
all land plots that were newly acquired (by rental or sale contracts) by existing farms and 
measure the distance between the farmstead and the centroid of the newly acquired land plot. 
Since the exact location of the farmstead is not provided in the dataset, we calculate it as the 
center of the plots operated by the farm in the previous year. This means that the center rather 
reflects the center of the farming activities than the actual farmstead. The distance 
corresponding to the 90th percentile is 11.8 km, which is larger than that in the Dutch land 
market (Figure 2). We are, however, not able to identify whether this results from different 
farming structures in both land markets or from the fact that Cotteleer et al. (2008) only 
consider sale transactions, while we also include rent transactions. To consider temporal 
development, Figure 2 also displays the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the 
distance for transactions between 2005 and 2006 and 2016 and 2017 separately. The 
distributions reveal that the farmer’s willingness to accept longer distances increased over the 
study period, which is in line with the increase in average farm size reported in Table 1. 
To compare the two approaches, for the whole study period we also calculate the percentage 
of transactions in which the farm and the acquired land plots lie within the same municipality 
(Figure 2). In 56.5 % of the transactions, the plot and the farm center are located within the 
same municipality. This implies that in nearly half of the transactions, farms expand beyond 
the borders of administrative units. Temesgen (2014) reports that for the land market in 
Brittany, France, 75 % of all sale transactions are within the same municipality. One potential 
source of the divergence is different farming structures in both study regions.  
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One problem that all approaches have in common and that cannot be solved with the available 
dataset is that the underlying database includes only actually transacted plots. Hence, 
information about whether farms unsuccessfully tried to expand beyond the considered region 
is not available in the dataset. This, however, is also an argument to account for larger regions 
than municipalities.  
Figure 3: Number of competitors, Gini coefficient, and Lorenz asymmetry coefficient in 
Brandenburg, 2005 and 2017 
 
Figure 3 depicts the number of competitors, the Gini coefficient, and the Lorenz asymmetry 
coefficient for the land market in Brandenburg for 2005 (upper panel) and 2017 (lower panel). 
The Gini coefficient is a measure of the degree of inequality between farm sizes on each farm’s 
relevant land market. Higher inequalities have a value closer to one. The Lorenz asymmetry 
coefficient (LAC) measures the asymmetry of the Lorenz curve and hence supports the 
interpretation of the Gini coefficient. If inequality arises from many small farms, it takes values 
below one whereas values above one indicate that the source of inequality is a few large farms. 
All indicators are computed by means of the farm-specific approach that considers a radius of 
11.8 km around the farm’s center. It is calculated for all farms (2005: 5,695, 2017: 5,248) and 
interpolated for Brandenburg using inverse distance weighing.2  
The number of competitors varies between 15 and 250 in Brandenburg and decreased from a 
mean of 88 in 2005 to a mean of 79 in 2017. The maximum is located in southeastern 
Brandenburg, a region characterized by a large share of olericulture and horticulture.  
                                                
2  Values close to the border of Brandenburg have to be interpreted with care since the farm’s relevant 
market may not be fully considered. 
# competitors, 2005 
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This implies smaller farm sizes and hence more competitors. The heterogeneity within 
Brandenburg is also reflected in the Gini coefficients, which range from 0.53 to 0.95 and have 
a mean of 0.73 in 2005 and 0.71 in 2017.3 While in northern Brandenburg, land is more equally 
distributed among farms, we observe stronger differences in farm sizes in the southern part of 
the state. In most regions in Brandenburg, the LAC is below one. This implies that the Lorenz 
curve is relatively steep at the end, i.e., large farms operate a particularly high share of land.  
All three indicators together allow us to characterize structural change in the farmland market 
in Brandenburg. The decrease in the number of competitors, which took place rather uniformly 
across all regions, led to an increase in average farm size (cf. Table 1). A decreasing Gini 
coefficient implies that the remaining farms face a more evenly distributed farmland market. 
The LAC remains below one in most regions, which suggests that larger farms still operate a 
large amount of land in 2017. Whether smaller farms are restricted in their expansion 
possibilities, however, cannot be determined and thus needs further investigation in the 
econometric analysis. 
5 Econometric Analysis of Farm Growth and Concentration in Brandenburg 
In the econometric analysis, we want to assess the impact of concentrated agricultural land 
markets on changes in farm structures. The analysis will reveal whether farms in Brandenburg 
are constrained by concentration and size inequality in agricultural land markets when 
expanding. We show how the probability and level of expansion depend on farm 
characteristics, as well as proxies for competition in agricultural land markets. Specifically, we 
apply the following two-stage Heckman (1979) model: 
Stage I:  Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 > 0|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖) = 𝚽𝚽(𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷′ + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖) 
Stage II:  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷′ + 𝛾𝛾IMR𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖          if  𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷′ + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 > 0. 
(1) 
Here, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 > 0 denotes a positive change in the size of farm 𝑖𝑖 . 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 is a vector of exogenous 
variables explaining the decision to expand and 𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊  is a vector of exogenous variables 
influencing the level of expansion. According to the exclusion restriction, 𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖 has to be a strict 
subset of 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖, i.e., at least one variable from the first stage has to be excluded in the second 
stage. To account for a selection bias introduced by restricting the analysis to expanding farms 
only, the inverse Mills ratio IMR𝑖𝑖 is included in the second stage.  
In the empirical application, we analyze how the probability of expansion and absolute change 
in agricultural area (in ha) from 2005 to 2017 depend on farm characteristics as well as proxies 
for land market competition. We estimate two two-stage models, which differ in the definition 
of the relevant land market when computing the concentration indicators. In the first model, we 
use a radius of 11.8 km, which is derived from the 90th percentile of transaction distances (farm-
specific approach, cf. Figure 2). In the second model, we define the relevant market by means 
of municipalities (municipality-based approach). The study object are farms that remain in the 
database over the whole study period. For the econometric analysis, we exclude all farms with 
                                                
3  Note that a direct comparison of Gini coefficients in 2005 and 2017 is difficult because the number 
of farms changes over time.  
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extreme expansion behavior (the lower and upper 0.5 %) to reduce the influence of outliers. 
Moreover, we exclude all farms operating less than one ha to account for potential inaccuracies 
in the dataset. This restricts the number of farms to 3,099 in the first stage estimation. Yet, the 
farms excluded from the analysis still remain present as neighboring farms, meaning that they 
are still included in the computation of the concentration indicators. In the second-stage 
estimation, we exclude all farms that either shrink or stagnate over the study period, which 
reduces the number of farms to 1,699. 
5.1 Explanatory Variables 
A descriptive overview of the included variables is provided in Table 2 (first stage) and Table 3 
(second stage). Both include internal farm characteristics that are hypothesized to affect farm 
growth, as well as proxies for land market competition. All variables are derived from the IACS 
dataset. 
With respect to Hypothesis 1 on the effect of farm size on the probability and amount of 
expansion, we include farm size in terms of total utilized agricultural area (UAA) (farmsize𝑖𝑖). 
Together, farm size and squared farm size (farmsize𝑖𝑖2) can identify the existence of non-linear 
effects of farm size on the probability and amount of expansion. In light of the discussion about 
optimal farm size, we would expect a positive effect of the linear term and a negative effect of 
the squared term on the probability and amount of expansion. Farm size has a mean of 
320.86 ha in the first stage and 247.89 ha in the second stage. Hence, the number of smaller 
farms increased in the subsample of expanding farms. While this might seem puzzling at first, 
the reason lies in the restriction of the dataset to those farms that survived over the study 
period. Moreover, this might be a specific phenomenon that applies to the study region due to 
Brandenburg’s dual agricultural structure.  
Regarding the second hypothesis that addresses whether farms expand if expansion helps 
consolidate land plots, we include two fragmentation indicators similar to Latruffe and Piet 
(2014). The first one measures the farm’s extension by means of the maximum distance 
between the center of the farming activity and the center of the most distant plot (extent𝑖𝑖), 
which is 4.98 km on average in Brandenburg in the first stage estimation and 4.34 km in the 
second stage estimation. In addition to the farm size, the maximum distance between the farm 
and the operated plots can provide further information about spatial extension. The second 
fragmentation-related indicator measures via a dummy variable if the farm were able to reduce 
its fragmentation over the study period. Here, farm-specific fragmentation is measured as the 
minimum distance between a plot and the nearest plot of the same farm, averaged over all 
plots of the farm. If this measure decreases over the study period, this means that the farm 
succeeded in putting its plots closer together and hence the farm consolidated and dummy 
variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
defragmentation  equals one. More than half of the farms consolidated (54 %). 
Fragmented farms consolidating over the study period could do so by expanding near their 
own plots (expansion) or by giving isolated plots away (shrinkage), so that the expected effect 
in the first-stage estimation is unclear. In the second stage, we exclude the variable 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
defragmentation  following the exclusion restriction. We hypothesize that defragmentation 
increases the probability of expansion as it might help increase the farm’s productivity, but that 
it should have no effect on the amount of extension as it cannot provide any information about 
the relative market position of the farm. 
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Table 2. Definition and descriptive statistics of variables included in the 1st stage, 
 𝑵𝑵 = 𝟑𝟑,𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 
Variable Code Mean St.dev. Lower 5 % Upper 5 % 
Internal farm 
characteristics      
Change in utilized agricultural 
area (UAA) (dummy) 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
∆farm_size>0 0.52 0.50 0 1 
UAA in ha farmsize𝑖𝑖  320.86 528.41 2.51 1426.96 
Maximum extent in km  extent𝑖𝑖  4.98 8.19 0 15.44 
Defragmentation (dummy) 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
defragmentation 0.54 0.49 0 1 
Competition proxies  
(farm-specific)      
Gini in % gini𝑖𝑖  70.56 4.64 62.97 77.70 
Interaction term: Gini and 
large farm dummy gini𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
large 36.96 35.41 0 76.34 
Number of competitors num_comp𝑖𝑖  86.57 35 40 133 
Competition proxies  
(municipalities)      
Gini in % gini𝑖𝑖  72.71 11.37 55.31 90.39 
Interaction term: Gini and 
large farm dummy gini𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
large 37.29 36.52 0 84.10 
Number of competitors num_comp𝑖𝑖  28.41 19.16 5 64 
Table 3. Definition and descriptive statistics of variables included in the 2nd stage, 
 𝑵𝑵 = 𝟏𝟏,𝟔𝟔𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 
Variable Code Mean St.dev. Lower 5 % Upper 5 % 
Internal farm 
characteristics      
Change in utilized agricultural 
area (UAA) (dummy) ∆farm_size𝑖𝑖
+ 105.33 158.68 0.76 453.31 
UAA in ha farmsize𝑖𝑖  247.89 439.24 1.991 1169.63 
Maximum extent in km  extent𝑖𝑖  4.34 7.14 0 13.44 
Competition proxies  
(farm-specific)      
Gini in % gini𝑖𝑖  70.53 4.60 63.11 77.81 
Interaction term: Gini and 
large farm dummy gini𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
large 31.4 0.35 0 76.13 
Number of competitors num_comp𝑖𝑖  87.12 35.13 41 133 
Competition proxies  
(municipalities)      
Gini in % gini𝑖𝑖  73.14 11.08 55.68 89.66 
Interaction term: Gini and 
large farm dummy gini𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
large 31.66 36.14 0 82.23 
Number of competitors num_comp𝑖𝑖  29.21 19.24 5 64 
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In addition to own farm characteristics, we include proxies for competition between farms in 
the close neighborhood to test Hypothesis 3, which relates to the Gini coefficient and number 
of competitors in the relevant region. The Gini coefficient (gini𝑖𝑖) of farm size in farm 𝑖𝑖’s region 
measures the degree of inequality of farm size distribution and changes only slightly between 
both stages of the estimation (70.56 % and 70,53 % in the first and second stage, respectively). 
We hypothesize that surviving farms in unequally distributed markets are more likely to expand 
than those in equally distributed markets. As effects should differ between small and large 
farms, we include an interaction term between the Gini coefficient and a dummy variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
large 
to indicate whether a farm is larger than the median farm (gini𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
large). We expect a positive 
influence on the farm’s probability of expansion as well as on the extent of expansion since the 
interaction term can indicate whether the farm has a predominant position in the local land 
market. A further indicator influencing the expansion possibility is the number of competitors 
(num_comp𝑖𝑖). With a lower number of competitors, farms may act as monopsonists and are 
more likely to acquire new land plots. Effects on the level of expansion are expected to be 
negative as a higher number of competitors could furthermore imply smaller plots in a region, 
which could lower the level of expansion. We exclude the CR and LAC as concentration 
indicators since they are highly correlated with other included variables and could thus lead to 
multicollinearity in the analysis.  
5.2 Results and Discussion 
In Table 4, we present the results from both two-stage models. To correct for heteroscedasticity, 
we apply robust standard errors in both models. The (Pseudo-)𝑅𝑅2 is rather low (5 % in the first 
stage and 24 % in the second stage), which is not surprising given the lack of socioeconomic 
and financial information of farms in our dataset. 
Table 4. Estimation results 
 Farm-specific approach Municipality-based approach 
 Stage I Stage II Stage I Stage II 
Variable Coef. St.err. Coef. St.err. Coef. St.err. Coef. St.err. 
intercept 0.0903 0.3496 44.233 99.452 -0.0664 0.1414 98.146 101.25 
Hypothesis 1         
farmsize𝑖𝑖  -0.0003** 0.0001 0.0903* 0.0466 -0.0003** 0.0001 0.0922** 0.0453 
farmsize𝑖𝑖
2 2.2e-08 3.7e-08 5.7e-06 2.0e-05 2.2e-08 3.7e-08 4.0e-06 2.0e-05 
Hypothesis 2         
extent𝑖𝑖  -0.0062 0.0028 0.0011* 0.0006 -0.0062 0.0029 0.0010* 0.0006 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
defragmentation -0.1033** 0.0462 - - -0.1077** 0.0463 - - 
Hypothesis 3         
gini𝑖𝑖  0.0044 0.0049 -0.0992 0.6986 0.0059*** 0.0021 -1.1467** 0.5214 
gini𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
large -0.0041*** 0.0009 1.0782*** 0.3387 -0.0040*** 0.0009 0.9879*** 0.3106 
num_comp𝑖𝑖  7.9e-05 0.0007 -0.0736 0.0753 0.0024* 0.0013 0.2255 0.2356 
IMR𝑖𝑖   - - 15.750 117.061 - - 29.111 111.561 
(Pseudo-)𝑅𝑅2 0.045  0.238  0.050  0.234  
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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The results from the two-stage model with the farm-specific approach defining the relevant 
market are not in line with our expectations from Hypothesis 1. In the first stage, we observe a 
statistically significant negative effect of farm size on the probability of expansion and a non-
significant positive effect of the squared farm size. The marginal effect of farm size is non-
constant, negative for the range of farm sizes in our sample, and rather small. For example, 
an increase in farm size from 300 to 400 ha reduces the expansion probability from 53.2 % to 
52.1 %, assuming that all other variables are held constant at their sample means. These 
results relate to the discussion about structural change in agriculture as they show that among 
surviving farms, smaller farms are not disadvantaged in terms of their expansion possibilities. 
This could reveal that for smaller farms to survive, expansion in terms of farm size is necessary. 
In the second-stage estimation, the signs of the coefficients change and the effect of farm size 
stays statistically significant and becomes positive. This indicates that among the expanding 
farms, larger farms expand more. Squared farm size is not statistically significant, but it has a 
positive sign which shows that larger farms grow disproportionately stronger. When interpreting 
these results, one should recall that the analysis includes surviving farms only.  
Regarding our second hypothesis, we observe a negative effect of the farm’s extension on the 
probability to expand. Our data, however, cannot reject the null hypothesis of no influence of 
the farm’s extension in the first stage. The defragmentation dummy variable shows a 
statistically significant negative coefficient in the first stage: The probability of expansion 
decreases by three percent for consolidating farms. That means that consolidation takes place 
by shrinking or substituting remote plots with nearer plots rather than by expanding. Despite 
the exclusion of the defragmentation dummy variable and the inclusion of the inverse Mills 
ratio in the second stage, it remains unclear whether our analysis would be subject to a sample 
selection bias since our data cannot reject the null hypothesis of no influence of the inverse 
Mills ratio in the second stage.  
The main focus of this paper is how land market competition affects the expansion behavior of 
farms (Hypothesis 3). In the first and second stage, we find statistically non-significant 
influences of the Gini coefficient for smaller farms. The significant interaction term between the 
Gini coefficient and farm size, however, demonstrates different reactions between the groups 
of large and small farms. In the second stage, we find that increased inequality leads to 
stronger expansion for larger farms: An increase in the Gini coefficient by 10 percentage points 
leads to an increase in expansion by 9.8 ha. Distinct effects for the groups of small and large 
farms could point at the existence of market power. However, the dimension of the coefficients 
and their statistical significance render this a vague finding. A further indicator of the market 
power potential is the number of competitors. The negative sign of the coefficient in the second 
stage is in line with our initial hypothesis. Our data, however, cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of no influence of the number of competitors in both stages.  
The results of the municipality-based approach are similar to those of the farm-specific 
approach, but differ for some variables. One important difference are the coefficients for both 
Gini variables. In the municipality-based approach, we observe that increasing inequality 
brings lower expansion for both large and small farms. This contradicts both the farm-specific 
approach and our initial hypothesis. One reason is that compared to small farms, large farms 
are more likely to act beyond administrative borders, which would imply that the municipality-
based approach affects large farms more.  
Jana Plogmann; Oliver Mußhoff; Martin Odening; Matthias Ritter 
Farm Growth and Land Concentration 
FORLand-Working Paper 24 (2020)   - 17 - 
6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the interplay of size changes of individual farms when competing for 
land. The main research question was to analyze whether regional farm structures impact 
future growth decisions of farms. Using geo-referenced plot-level data for the German federal 
state of Brandenburg, we determine the concentration of operated farmland by means of 
various concentration measures. Together with fragmentation indices, these measures are 
used to describe regional structures in the agricultural land market. We calculate and compare 
these indices for administrative units (municipalities), as well as for farm-specific boundaries. 
In doing so, we address the problem of defining the relevant geographical land market. In the 
subsequent econometric analysis, we apply a Heckman two-stage model to investigate how 
land market concentration affects the probability and level of farm expansion.  
Our study offers four notable results. First, regarding the relevant size of the land market, we 
find that about half of the land transactions occur beyond municipality borders. This underlines 
the importance of carefully defining the neighborhood when computing concentration 
measures. These differences translate into small divergences in the results of the econometric 
analysis. Secondly, the descriptive analysis shows that the temporal and spatial development 
of farming structures in Brandenburg is heterogeneous. On a state-level average, 
concentration rates of farms decreased slightly between 2005 and 2017. For single 
municipalities, however, we observe both increasing and decreasing concentration rates. The 
Gini coefficient decreases between 2005 and 2017, indicating lower inequality among the 
farms being active in 2017 compared to those being active in 2005. Third, results of the 
econometric analysis show that for farms that remained active between 2005 and 2017, farms 
that defragment are less likely to expand. Finally, we find that higher inequality of land 
distribution leads to distinct expansion effects for large and small farms. Even though the 
reported effects are rather small, it is tempting to interpret this finding as evidence for the 
existence of market power effects on land markets. At this point, one should recall the 
ambiguity of concentration measures mentioned in the theoretical background. The policy 
implications of the two interpretations of increasing concentration rates are diametrical: 
Concentration that enables market power and thus deviations from a socially optimal resource 
allocation calls for competition policy and market regulation, whereas concentration as a result 
of structural change and sectoral adjustment processes does not. Consequently, it is not 
sufficient to solely inspect concentration measures as indicators of market power. 
Our results feed into the current debate on land market regulations in the EU. In 2017, the 
European Commission issued guidelines confirming that EU member states are allowed to 
take measures against excessive speculation and concentration on agricultural land markets. 
Though sound ownership distribution and fair access of all farms to this production factor is an 
important objective of agricultural policy, little empirical knowledge exists about the spatio-
temporal diffusion of farm sizes. Our paper provides an example how existing administrative 
data can be used for this purpose. The applicability of our findings to other regions is difficult 
due to the specific (dual) farm structure in Brandenburg, which still reflects the legacy of the 
socialistic era. Further caveats result from the informational content of our IACS dataset. While 
its high spatial resolution is a strength, missing information about the economic and financial 
situation renders the explanation of farms’ growth and exit decisions difficult. Furthermore, the 
identification of informal holding structures, which play a role in agricultural land markets, at 
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least in Eastern Germany, is not possible. Merging IACS data with land ownership information 
from cadaster or financial data from agricultural census data would be a promising effort for 
further empirical analyses on structural change and land market competition. 
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